Content-Security-Policy
Reveal needs two directives. The bundle is loaded from api.pryntid.com (the same host the events go to), so one host covers both:
Content-Security-Policy:
script-src 'self' https://api.pryntid.com;
connect-src 'self' https://api.pryntid.com;
# Loading the bundle from npm's CDN instead of https://api.pryntid.com? Add that host to script-src too:
# script-src 'self' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;
# Self-hosted Prynt: replace https://api.pryntid.com with your own API host in both directives.The one-line snippet starts Reveal from an inline onload attribute. Strict policies without 'unsafe-inline' need a nonce on the tag, or a second script of yours that calls PryntReveal.reveal():
# The one-line snippet uses an inline onload="…" handler. If your policy has no 'unsafe-inline'
# (or uses nonces/hashes), either give the script tag your nonce:
<script nonce="{{ nonce }}" src="https://api.pryntid.com/cdn/prynt-reveal.umd.js" async onload="PryntReveal.reveal({publicKey:'pk_live_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY'})"></script>
# or drop onload and start Reveal from a nonce'd/hashed script of your own:
<script src="https://api.pryntid.com/cdn/prynt-reveal.umd.js" defer></script>
<script nonce="{{ nonce }}">window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => PryntReveal.reveal({ publicKey: 'pk_live_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY' }));</script>No other host is ever contacted: no third-party identity graphs, no geolocation services, no ad partners. Events use fetch with keepalive and navigator.sendBeacon on unload, credentials: 'omit', Content-Type: text/plain (a CORS simple request, so no preflight). A blocked connect-src shows up as cspBlocked: true in diagnose() and in the ?prynt_debug=1 panel.
Cookies: none
PryntReveal.reveal() writes **no cookies**. There is no cross-site identifier, no third-party cookie and nothing is synced to anyone else's identity graph.
If you also use the device-intelligence agent (Prynt.load() + identify(), a separate product in the same bundle), that agent persists its own visitor id redundantly in a first-party cookie __prynt_id (Max-Age 1 year, SameSite=Lax, Secure on https), the localStorage key __prynt_id and an IndexedDB database __prynt. Reveal only reads that id when Prynt.load() ran on the page and consent is true.
localStorage: one key
| Key | Value | Purpose | Lifetime |
|---|---|---|---|
prynt_rvs | {"id":"rvs_…","last":<ms>} | The session id (24 random characters) and the time of the last event, so pageviews of one visit are grouped | Renewed after 30 minutes without events; the key stays until the browser clears site data |
When storage is blocked (Safari private mode, a locked-down browser) the session lives in memory for the lifetime of the page; diagnose().storage then says blocked. Nothing else is written: no fingerprint, no email, no visitor history.
What is sent
Every batch is one POST to /v1/reveal/collect with at most 50 events, flushed every 2 seconds or at 10 queued events, and beaconed on unload:
POST https://api.pryntid.com/v1/reveal/collect Content-Type: text/plain (JSON)
{
"publicKey": "pk_live_…", "website": "example.com",
"sessionId": "rvs_…", "visitorId": null, // visitorId only with the full agent (Prynt.load()) AND consent
"consent": true, "consentSource": "cookiebot", // config | override | gpc | cookieyes | cookiebot | onetrust | klaro | tcf | gcm | default
"events": [
{ "eventId": "evt_…", "kind": "pageview", "url": "https://example.com/pricing?utm_source=linkedin",
"path": "/pricing", "title": "Pricing", "ts": "2026-11-03T10:00:00.000Z",
"referrer": "https://www.google.com/", "utm": { "source": "linkedin", "gclid": true } },
{ "eventId": "evt_…", "kind": "engagement", "durationMs": 15000, "scrollPct": 80, … },
{ "eventId": "evt_…", "kind": "form", "identity": { "email": "[email protected]", "formId": "demo" }, "shielded": true, … }
]
}| Field | With consent | Without consent |
|---|---|---|
url, path, title | Full URL (fragment removed, ESP click tokens removed) | Origin + path only — no query string |
referrer | document.referrer, then the previous page on SPA navigations | Not sent |
utm | utm_* values; gclid/fbclid as booleans (presence only, never the value) | Not sent |
engagement | Active (visible) milliseconds since the last engagement event and max scroll depth | Not sent |
custom (track) | Name + flat props (max 20 keys, 200 chars; keys that look like PII are dropped) | Held in memory, sent only if consent arrives |
identity (forms / identify) | Email and name from your own form or login; formId | Held (or dropped for forms) unless requireConsent:false |
props.espToken | {provider, token} from mc_eid, _hsenc, _kx, vgo_ee, _cio_id, mkt_tok… — a 'came from your newsletter' signal | Not sent |
visitorId | The device-intelligence id when Prynt.load() ran on the page | null |
consentSource | Where the consent decision came from (see Consent) | Same |
botHint | true when the user agent matches a compact crawler/headless list (the server still decides) | Same |
On the server the IP address is used for the company lookup and then minimised and hashed with a salt — raw IPs are never stored in Reveal tables. Form field values are read only on submit, only from the email input and the input named name; passwords, hidden inputs and every other field are never read.
Self-hosted
With your own Prynt server, replace api.pryntid.com by your API host in both directives and pass endpoint: 'https://your-prynt-server' to PryntReveal.reveal() (the console snippet does this for you).
Last updated 2026-11-03 · Limits · Visitor opt-out