Documentation · Prynt Reveal

CSP, cookies, storage and what is sent

Security reviewers ask three things: which hosts the script talks to, what it stores on the device, and what leaves the browser. Here are all three, with nothing omitted.

Content-Security-Policy

Reveal needs two directives. The bundle is loaded from api.pryntid.com (the same host the events go to), so one host covers both:

Content-Security-Policy:
  script-src  'self' https://api.pryntid.com;
  connect-src 'self' https://api.pryntid.com;

# Loading the bundle from npm's CDN instead of https://api.pryntid.com? Add that host to script-src too:
#   script-src 'self' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;
# Self-hosted Prynt: replace https://api.pryntid.com with your own API host in both directives.

The one-line snippet starts Reveal from an inline onload attribute. Strict policies without 'unsafe-inline' need a nonce on the tag, or a second script of yours that calls PryntReveal.reveal():

# The one-line snippet uses an inline onload="…" handler. If your policy has no 'unsafe-inline'
# (or uses nonces/hashes), either give the script tag your nonce:
<script nonce="{{ nonce }}" src="https://api.pryntid.com/cdn/prynt-reveal.umd.js" async onload="PryntReveal.reveal({publicKey:'pk_live_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY'})"></script>

# or drop onload and start Reveal from a nonce'd/hashed script of your own:
<script src="https://api.pryntid.com/cdn/prynt-reveal.umd.js" defer></script>
<script nonce="{{ nonce }}">window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => PryntReveal.reveal({ publicKey: 'pk_live_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY' }));</script>

No other host is ever contacted: no third-party identity graphs, no geolocation services, no ad partners. Events use fetch with keepalive and navigator.sendBeacon on unload, credentials: 'omit', Content-Type: text/plain (a CORS simple request, so no preflight). A blocked connect-src shows up as cspBlocked: true in diagnose() and in the ?prynt_debug=1 panel.

Cookies: none

PryntReveal.reveal() writes **no cookies**. There is no cross-site identifier, no third-party cookie and nothing is synced to anyone else's identity graph.

If you also use the device-intelligence agent (Prynt.load() + identify(), a separate product in the same bundle), that agent persists its own visitor id redundantly in a first-party cookie __prynt_id (Max-Age 1 year, SameSite=Lax, Secure on https), the localStorage key __prynt_id and an IndexedDB database __prynt. Reveal only reads that id when Prynt.load() ran on the page and consent is true.

localStorage: one key

KeyValuePurposeLifetime
prynt_rvs{"id":"rvs_…","last":<ms>}The session id (24 random characters) and the time of the last event, so pageviews of one visit are groupedRenewed after 30 minutes without events; the key stays until the browser clears site data

When storage is blocked (Safari private mode, a locked-down browser) the session lives in memory for the lifetime of the page; diagnose().storage then says blocked. Nothing else is written: no fingerprint, no email, no visitor history.

What is sent

Every batch is one POST to /v1/reveal/collect with at most 50 events, flushed every 2 seconds or at 10 queued events, and beaconed on unload:

POST https://api.pryntid.com/v1/reveal/collect      Content-Type: text/plain (JSON)
{
  "publicKey": "pk_live_…", "website": "example.com",
  "sessionId": "rvs_…", "visitorId": null,            // visitorId only with the full agent (Prynt.load()) AND consent
  "consent": true, "consentSource": "cookiebot",       // config | override | gpc | cookieyes | cookiebot | onetrust | klaro | tcf | gcm | default
  "events": [
    { "eventId": "evt_…", "kind": "pageview", "url": "https://example.com/pricing?utm_source=linkedin",
      "path": "/pricing", "title": "Pricing", "ts": "2026-11-03T10:00:00.000Z",
      "referrer": "https://www.google.com/", "utm": { "source": "linkedin", "gclid": true } },
    { "eventId": "evt_…", "kind": "engagement", "durationMs": 15000, "scrollPct": 80, … },
    { "eventId": "evt_…", "kind": "form", "identity": { "email": "[email protected]", "formId": "demo" }, "shielded": true, … }
  ]
}
FieldWith consentWithout consent
url, path, titleFull URL (fragment removed, ESP click tokens removed)Origin + path only — no query string
referrerdocument.referrer, then the previous page on SPA navigationsNot sent
utmutm_* values; gclid/fbclid as booleans (presence only, never the value)Not sent
engagementActive (visible) milliseconds since the last engagement event and max scroll depthNot sent
custom (track)Name + flat props (max 20 keys, 200 chars; keys that look like PII are dropped)Held in memory, sent only if consent arrives
identity (forms / identify)Email and name from your own form or login; formIdHeld (or dropped for forms) unless requireConsent:false
props.espToken{provider, token} from mc_eid, _hsenc, _kx, vgo_ee, _cio_id, mkt_tok… — a 'came from your newsletter' signalNot sent
visitorIdThe device-intelligence id when Prynt.load() ran on the pagenull
consentSourceWhere the consent decision came from (see Consent)Same
botHinttrue when the user agent matches a compact crawler/headless list (the server still decides)Same

On the server the IP address is used for the company lookup and then minimised and hashed with a salt — raw IPs are never stored in Reveal tables. Form field values are read only on submit, only from the email input and the input named name; passwords, hidden inputs and every other field are never read.

Self-hosted

With your own Prynt server, replace api.pryntid.com by your API host in both directives and pass endpoint: 'https://your-prynt-server' to PryntReveal.reveal() (the console snippet does this for you).

Next: Consent

Last updated 2026-11-03 · Limits · Visitor opt-out